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A B S T R A C T
The idea that power relations structure social life is self-evident to most anthropologists. Western medical knowledge
or biomedicine, and by extension science or scientific knowledge, however, has until relatively recently been exempt from
anthropological scrutiny in political terms. An understanding of biomedicine as a system of knowledge that is not a copy
of facts but a representation of them has entailed a break with the traditional separation of folk knowledge and scientific
knowledge in anthropology, making it possible to include biomedicine in the repertoire of ethnographic objects. The pecu-
liarity of biomedicine as a cultural system, seen from this perspective, lies in a paradox: its self-characterization as a set
of non-ideological discourses and practices is a representation that conceals its ideological and power-saturated nature.
Through an analysis of DSM-IV-TR, this article explores some of the representational strategies through which this con-
cealment takes place in biomedical psychiatry: the asocial and universal character of mental illness categories; the neu-
trality of clinical practice; and the non-moral nature of clinical criteria and judgment. These are concealed metaphors in
the true sense, for not only do they speak of something without naming it but they also deny their own existence as meta-
phors.
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Introduction
The idea that power relations structure social life is
self-evident to most anthropologists and can be easily
traced back through the anthropological literature of the
last 150 years. Ever since Maine’s Ancient Law1, which
postulates that kinship can also be regarded as a primary
sociopolitical structure, anthropology has been aware of
the ubiquitousness of power. There is, however, a sphere
of discourse and social activity that has traditionally
been exempt from anthropological scrutiny in political
terms, at least until three decades ago2: Western medical
knowledge or biomedicine, and by extension science or
scientific knowledge.
One reason for this lack of political analysis is the fact
that anthropology, as a social science, aspires to the sta-
tus of scientific knowledge, and any attempt to treat sci-
ence as one ethnoepistemology among many others im-
plies that the anthropological gaze may even be trained
on anthropology itself as an object of study. If the Human
Genome Project3 or biomedical theories of stress4 can be-
come ethnographic objects, then why not Lévi-Straus-
sian structuralism5 or Csordas’s embodiment paradigm?6
In fact, this self-reflexive leap was the innovation of
North American postmodern anthropology, and in some
cases its only contribution. As reflective readers of the in-
tellectual production of their own discipline, ethnogra-
phers became the informants of their own personal anxi-
eties concerning the construction of ethnographic texts.
In most of these postmodern texts, however, the pro-
tagonism of the author as the main character eclipses the
possibility of deep ethnoepistemological reflection on the
construction of scientific rationality.
A second reason for reluctance to treat science as an
object of study is the clear distinction between folk
knowledge and scientific knowledge in cultural anthro-
pology. Traditionally, anthropology regarded these two
universes of discourse and practice as essentially differ-
ent and irreconcilable, and as a result indigenous medi-
cal systems and lay medical knowledge were considered
appropriate ethnographic objects but not primary health
care centers or psychiatric theories of depression. The
development of social studies of science and technology,
cultural studies of Western biomedicine and what Heath
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and Rabinow have called the anthropology of new genet-
ics and immunology7 highlighted the erasure of the folk/
scientific dividing line. This should not, however, be re-
garded as a rejection of scientific rationality itself, but as
a consequence of rigorously applying the scientific me-
thod. Young8 tells us that »The culture of science says
that no meaning is immune from scrutiny«. Science can-
not be an exception to itself.
Not all obstacles to a sociocultural study of science
have their origin in anthropology and, therefore, in the
researcher. Some of them originate in the object of re-
search. As Habermas pointed out9, one of the constants
of scientific thought, at least in its more positivist incar-
nations, is that all forms of self-reflection by the re-
searcher have been eliminated. In this way, Habermas
argues, scientific thought has fallen into the contradic-
tion of focusing on the terrain of objects in order to un-
mask »the fictions of the natural world of life« while dis-
missing the researcher’s reflexivity as a metaphysical
„phantasmagoria«. This may explain the positivist illu-
sion that scientific categories are a »copy of facts,« possi-
ble only if the researcher and her/his social context are
omitted. This in turn may explain some of the resistance
to an anthropology of science and scientific knowledge.
How can we account for the »transparency« of scientific
knowledge? How can we define the political and social di-
mensions of science if science is isomorphic with reality?
The problem of the supposed transparency of science
is one of the most significant challenges facing contem-
porary cultural anthropology. In comparison with more
traditional knowledge structures such as myths, which
tend to make explicit their values, their cultural singu-
larity, their local moral world and to some extent the po-
litical dimension of their symbolic expressions, scientific
discourse has proved particularly opaque to cultural
analysis because it presents itself as a non-ideological,
universal, apolitical and objective system. Anthropologi-
cal studies of biomedicine have attempted to solve the
problem of transparency, which renders power invisible,
in a variety of ways ranging from hermeneutics to critical
theory. Some authors10, 11 have applied the Geertzian
idea of cultural system to the terrain of biomedicine and
thus restored to view its concealed sociality. Others, such
as Taussig12, have gone further and shown the logical
correspondence between biomedicine and the political
economy of capitalism. Although none of these authors
say so explicitly, however, what has allowed them all to
make biomedicine their object of study is the realization
that transparency is not inherent in biomedicine but an
ideological representation of it.
This can be couched in more schematic and synthetic
terms: biomedicine is not a copy of facts but a represen-
tation of facts that presents itself as an objective system
of knowledge in order to conceal its social and political di-
mensions. But to what extent is this true? And if it is
true, how does biomedicine construct the invisibility of
its social power? In what follows, I will try to answer
these questions by analysing four principles that mask
power in biomedical psychiatry: asociality, universality,
neutrality and amorality. These four principles are con-
cealed metaphors in the true sense, for they not only
speak of power without naming it, but they also deny
their own existence as tropes.
Concealed Metaphors
Asociality
In her controversial book Death without Weeping,
Nancy Scheper-Hughes13 analyses the social conse-
quences of hunger in Brazil, a dramatic phenomenon
that has changed considerably with the recent imple-
mentation of social policies aimed at improving the living
conditions of the poor and reducing morbidity and mor-
tality. After describing the living conditions that pre-
vailed in the favelas of the 1980s and their impact on the
health of this population, she suggests that the govern-
ment’s strategy at the time was to medicalize hunger, in-
dividualizing a large-scale social problem and thereby
draining it of its political potential. In this way, she ar-
gues, biomedicine short-circuits the development of a so-
cial conscience.
Some years before, in his article »Reification and the
Consciousness of the Patient«, Taussig12 had also high-
lighted biomedicine’s desire for power. Following Lu-
kács’14 work on the reification of class consciousness
among the proletariat, Taussig illustrates his argument
with the case of a 49-year-old working-class patient diag-
nosed with polymyositis. Taussig argues that the signs
and symptoms of his informant’s disease are not merely
biological dysfunctions. In his words:
»I am going to argue that things such as the signs
and symptoms of disease, as much as the technology
of healing, are not ‘things in themselves’, are not only
biological and physical, but are also signs of social re-
lations disguised as natural things, concealing their
roots in human reciprocity.«
Taussig perceives symptoms and signs as meaningful
realities that condense critically sensitive and contradic-
tory components of culture and social relations. »The
manifestations of disease are like symbols,« he writes,
pointing out that health practitioners make diagnoses
with »an eye trained by the social determinants of per-
ception.« However, biomedicine and its practitioners re-
ject this view in favour of an orientation which allows the
illness experience to be dehistoricized and desocialized;
that is to say, it is reified with the aim of reproducing a
particular social order: the capitalist system.
To support his analysis, Taussig uses Lukács’ argu-
ment that the Western notion of objectivity was in fact an
illusion created by capitalist relations of production; in-
stead of piercing this illusion, Marxist authors such as
Lenin and Engels accepted it uncritically, and perpetu-
ated in their writings. In its refusal to recognize the so-
cial component in the signs and symptoms of illness,
Taussig argues, biomedicine reifies human relations, and
this in turn gives rise to what Lukács defined as a »phan-
tom-objectivity«, a mystification through which capital-
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ist political ideology is reproduced in the name of a sup-
posedly objective »science of real things«.
Both Scheper-Hughes’ and Taussig’s work suggests
that biomedicine is politically instrumentalized. In the
first case, the context is a population suffering from
chronic hunger. In the second, an informant refuses to
accept the individualization of her disease and therefore
questions the arbitrariness of biomedical knowledge.
However, our curiosity is aroused at this point not only
by the phenomenon of instrumentalization but also by
what makes this instrumentalization possible. What is
the source of biomedicine’s ability to individualise ill-
ness? What makes people regard health problems as
something personal that cannot be blamed on the struc-
ture of social relations or political-economic conditions?
In other words, what makes the power expressed through
biomedicine invisible? To a considerable extent, the an-
swer is provided by Taussig’s concept of reification, but it
needs to be made more explicit and gone into in greater
detail.
There is no need to accept Taussig’s argument that
every manifestation of disease is social rather than bio-
logical in order to observe that biomedicine has a ten-
dency to reify phenomena. Medical terminology itself
gives us clues about this reification through the distinc-
tion between sign and symptom. The sign, also known as
physical sign or objective symptom, is the objective evi-
dence of a disease defined by the professional. Examples
of physical signs are fever, eczema or even the radio-
graphic representation of pulmonary emphysema. By
contrast, the symptom, also known as subjective symp-
tom, is the subjective evidence of a disease. Some manu-
als define symptoms as patients’ descriptions of an expe-
rience that is unconfortable for them. This distinction
between sign and symptom is characteristic of most med-
ical manuals and dictionaries, and it serves to distinguish
between the physical manifestations of disease and cul-
tural constructions such as an Igbo idiom of distress for
the somatic manifestations of a mental disorder: »Things
like ants keep on creeping in various parts of my brain«15.
One of the strategies of biomedicine is to convert
symptoms into signs, patients’ accounts into biological
phenomena that can only be treated in the somatic di-
mension. In this way, social processes are reified: by re-
moving the patient from the sphere of disease, the clini-
cian is free to treat only biology. Perhaps this can be seen
more clearly in the following example drawn from my
field notes.
We are in the outpatient psychiatry department of
one of the most important public hospitals in Barcelona.
At quarter past eleven a patient, Mrs. R, entered the con-
sulting room.
In response to the question, »What brought you in to-
day?« she said, »Oh, my God! Life has no meaning since
my husband died«. The clinician scrawled »feelings of
hopelessness« on his report sheet as the patient contin-
ued with her narrative, explaining that her daughter was
now grown up and wanted to live on her own. She said
that she felt useless because she had always dedicated
herself completely to her family and now she had no fam-
ily. Her mother had died a couple of years earlier and she
felt that »the walls were closing in« on her. The clinician
did not wait for the patient to elaborate, and asked, »Do
you feel tired in the mornings? Have you lost weight re-
cently?«. The patient did not really understand why he
was asking these questions and continued to talk about
her everyday problems. The clinician reacted rather im-
patiently and asked, »Have you ever thought about sui-
cide? Do you sleep well at night? How long have you been
feeling like this?«. The patient answered that as a good
Catholic she had never contemplated suicide and consid-
ered it a mortal sin, and went on to speak of her feelings
of sadness, isolation, loneliness and uncertainty about
the future. The session ended with the psychiatrist rec-
ommending treatment with an antidepressant. The pa-
tient retorted, »These pills aren’t going to get rid of what
I’ve got«.
I offer this case not because it is necessarily paradig-
matic of all therapeutic relations, but because it serves as
an example of how a narrative of symptoms is reified into
signs of disease. The clinician assumes the position that
Lacan16 captured as the knowing subject in contrast to
that of the unknowing patient who turns to the psychia-
trist in search of relief, both for her distress and for the
anguish it causes17. Patients describe their feelings, re-
late their symptoms and tell the story of their affliction.
From this wealth of detail the psychiatrist salvages only
a few facts that serve as the basis for a diagnosis. This
salvage operation involves converting »Oh, my God! Life
has no meaning since my husband died« into »feelings of
hopelessness«. If in the telling the patient’s story seems
to wander from the subject (»My daughter’s grown up
now and wants to live on her own«) the psychiatrist may
listen patiently for a bit, but finally asks, »Do you feel
tired in the mornings? Have you lost weight recently?«.
The patient gets the point and tries to be more focused.
Once again the psychiatrist interrupts with more ques-
tions: »Have you ever thought about suicide? Have you
ever thought that life just wasn’t worth living? Do you
sleep well at night?« The patient responds to these ques-
tions, but in biographical and moral terms:. Again the cli-
nician tries to narrow it down to »How long have you
been feeling like this?«, or »Are you taking any medica-
tions?«, thus converting the story into an inventory of
facts reshaped in terms of diagnostic criteria.
Situations similar to the one outlined above have
been defined by Brown18 as the opposition between the
patient who tells a story (his or her own), and the psychi-
atrist who follows the story as he would a mystery, in
search of clues and evidence. At first this idea seems sug-
gestive. Think of the traces of pipe tobacco smoke still
floating in the air, the mud on the shoes of Mr. X, the mi-
croscopic piece of Persian carpet that gives Sherlock
Holmes a vital piece of information for solving the case.
In an apparently similar fashion, the clinician untangles
the patient’s tale, not to take pleasure in it but to convert
it into a language of facts: »low energy«, »insomnia«, and
»poor appetite«, but also »feelings of hopelessness« and
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»low self-esteem.« Symptoms are reduced to the same
level of objectivity as the mudstained shoes or the pipe
smoke in a process of inference through which what the
patient says is transformed into the logic of real facts,
natural signs whose meaning depends on the logical and
conceptual framework in terms of which the receiver of
the message interprets them. In this way the original
meaning is erased because it is inexpert, ignorant of the
true code by which facts acquire meaning: weight loss,
feelings of hopelessness, poor appetite, suicidal thoughts
and insomnia as manifestations of depression.
However, clinical procedure and criminal investiga-
tion are not entirely similar. Like Holmes, the psychia-
trist also wants to find out »whodunit«, but has the ad-
vantage of a ready-made classification. In addition, the
signs of interest to a psychiatrist are natural and univer-
salizable, while the detective has to confront a potential-
ly infinite variety of individual situations because human
will has intervened, a »motive« grounded in intention.
This is why, despite Brown’s suggestive title, »Psychiat-
ric Intake as a Mystery Story«, the resemblance between
the clinician and the detective is only apparent, and the
interpretive processes move in opposite directions: while
the detective reads human will into footprints, pipe smo-
ke and other physical evidence, the clinician naturalizes
a narrative of experience.
This process of reification and biologization is espe-
cially clear in psychiatry, but it can also be observed in
the rest of biomedicine. Social scientists are often sur-
prised by the use that biomedical literature makes of so-
cial and cultural phenomena. It treats risk behaviours,
cultural habits, socioeconomic status or social class as if
these variables were biological and independent of social
context19. As Taussig points out, the function of biologi-
zation is not only to reify social realities, but also to ob-
scure the power-saturated nature of this process.
Universality
Closely related to this process of desocialization is an
approach that uses another metaphor, that of time, to
construct transparency and render power relations invis-
ible: universalization. The signs and symptoms of disease
treated as if they were the same in different historical pe-
riods and cultural contexts20. Although we cannot deny
the value of this idea in the treatment of many diseases,
we should not regard it as an unshakable premise. There
are, in fact, no criteria of normality that exist independ-
ently of the sociocultural characteristics of different pop-
ulations. And this principle of relativity (not necessarily
of relativism) is applicable not only across cultures but
also to diferent social groups sharing the same cultural
context. It is well known that the same physical disorder
is experienced very different by a Wall Street executive, a
lumberjack, a monk, and a combat pilot. Hypotension,
for example, may pass unnoticed by the monk but may be
a most worrisome disorder for the pilot21.
If biomedical knowledge is limited, like all knowledge,
by the construction of categories and criteria that estab-
lish the nature and reality of facts, can these criteria be
totally independent of the context of cultural values, aes-
thetic forms, and political-economic conditions within
which they have been produced? Obviously not. Faced
with biomedical categories of normality and abnormality,
we should ask: normal for whom? And normal for what?
The distinction between the normal and the pathological
is not value-free but socially normative. As Canguilhem
points out in La Connaissance de la vie, »Toujours le con-
cept du »normal«, dans l’ordre humain, reste un concept
normatif et de portée proprement philosophique« [The
concept of the normal, in the human order, always re-
mains a normative concept of inherently philosophical
import]22.
Perhaps this universalization is most pronounced in
biomedical psychiatry, which has been challenged by the
so-called culture-bound syndromes specific to a particu-
lar culture, among which windigo, susto and koro are the
best-known examples. Common sense suggests that if lo-
cal diseases and syndromes exist, then universal defini-
tions of pathology should be questioned, but contempo-
rary psychiatry has moved in the opposite direction,
reifying and universalizing not only diseases but also the
psychosocial characteristics associated with them. Let us
take a look at some examples.
In its chapter on multiaxial assessment, the DSM-
-IVTR23, the diagnostic manual par excellence of contem-
porary psychiatry, discusses examples of diagnoses and
recording of data. The first of them is the following:
»Axis I: 296.23 Major depressive disorder.
Single episode, severe without psychotic features.
305.00 Alcohol abuse
Axis II: 301.60 Dependent personality disorder.
Frequent use of denial.
Axis III: None.
Axis IV: Threat of job loss.
Axis V: GAF = 35 (current).«
Information about the patients is introduced into a
structure consisting of various axes. The first axis is for
the so-called »clinical disorders and other conditions that
may be a focus of clinical attention«; the second is for
»personality disorders and mental retardation«; the
third for »general medical conditions«; the fourth for
»psychosocial and environmental problems«; and finally,
the fifth for »global assessment of functioning«. Of these
five axes, the first three are the ones that are normally
included in clinical reports, while the last two are gener-
ally used only in research, and are considered secondary
in clinical practice. But the basic problem is that the indi-
vidual who gives form to this wealth of categories, dis-
eases, disorders and circumstances is practically annulled
as a referent, because the various disorders are expressed
in a logic of their own that needs no biographical shape.
The emphasis is on diseases and not on patients, rein-
forcing the idea that an individual »suffers from a disor-
der« rather than »is disturbed«. The cataloguing of the
disorders inhabiting the patient’s body (»major depres-
sion«, »alcohol abuse«, »dependent personality disorder«)
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reasserts the model of »suffering from,« and weakens the
links between the disease and the patient’s being. The
patient is thus converted into a mute space in which dif-
ferent pathological species coincide. It is of little impor-
tance that an appendix included in DSM-IV (and DSM-IV
TR) provides a glossary of culture-bound syndromes and
appears to stress the importance of cultural and social
factors in the aetiology, course and outcome of mental
disorders. The patients’ voices have no place in the
multiaxial system of DSM-IVTR. This naturalistic ap-
proach denies us access to large or small worlds of mean-
ing, to the cultural categories and political-economic re-
lations that a complaint may contain. It disregards the
possible understanding of the patient’s narrative in fa-
vour of a botany of mental illnesses.
Instead of relativizing diagnostic categories such as
»depression«, »alcohol abuse«, »dependent personality
disorder« and »frequent use of denial«, I want to focus on
the universalization of social factors supposedly linked to
these categories. A case in point is Axis IV, »threat of job
loss.« Unlike changes in glucose levels or the hyperacti-
vation of the dopaminergic pathways, »threat of job loss«
is not a variable that can be defined in universalistic
terms. In the first place, the concept of a »job« refers to
social contexts in which formalized types of work are
dominant, and therefore not to all social contexts. In the
second place, although the »threat of job loss« is becom-
ing more and more generalized in formalized work con-
texts, it does not apply equally to all occupational sectors
or to informal sectors. Finally, people who experience the
»threat of job loss« perceive and experience this situation
in a variety of ways. The significance of the »threat of job
loss« depends on such varied things as religious morality,
work values, patterns of masculinity and feminity and
their association with the job, and social class. The mean-
ing of »threat of job loss« possesses what Clifford Geertz
(cita) called an »aura of factuality« because it is inextri-
cably linked to a moral world inhabited by both patients
and clinicians. This, however, does not mean that it is a
universal fact, since the anthropological literature tea-
ches us that »threat of job loss« may be as exotic for a Yap
or a Trobriand Islander as »loss of influence in the
tabinau« (a residence group associated with magar or
working the land) or »not being in the kula« (a ceremo-
nial exchange system in the Western Pacific) is for us.
Neutrality
If diseases are objective deviations from a biological
norm and therefore independent of social background, if
they can be universalized without taking into account lo-
cal realities, then it seems viable to believe in the neu-
tral, objective and rational nature of the biomedical
knowledge system itself. In other words, both diagnosis
and treatment are perceived as neutral processes in
which the values of the professional are neither impor-
tant nor relevant to clinical practice and medical re-
search. Biomedicine (and biomedical psychiatry) emer-
ges, then, as a knowledge system free from metaphors
and unaffected by social, political and economic factors.
The functionality of this assumption is, according to
Mishler19, obvious:
Thus, the view of medicine as a science serves to
justify physicians’ control over technical, esoteric
knowledge, and at the same time such control sup-
ports claims for professional autonomy and self-regu-
lation.
The idea of the autonomy of the professional group is
one of the most frequently reiterated arguments in bio-
medical literature and one of the pillars on which the no-
tion of scientific neutrality has been built. The following
quotation from an article by Klerman24 demonstrates the
extent to which corporate self-regulation in psychiatry is
an article of faith:
In discussing the history of psychiatry, one of my
premises is that professional groups, such as medical
specialities, are able to determine their own destiny to
a greater extent than most other occupational groups.
The force of this assertion is scarcely blunted by the
final words of the quotation: »to a greater extent than
other occupational groups«. It is hardly surprising that
biologically oriented psychiatry should amplify the ideo-
logical features that define the biomedical model. His-
torically, psychiatrists have struggled to defend their ter-
ritory among the medical sciences, with the added bur-
den of knowing that successes in their field paled into
relative insignificance beside the achievements of bio-
medicine in terms of understanding disease aetiology,
pinpointing the location of disease in the body through
imaging techniques, and effective treatment. Klerman’s
statement reveals an ideological project that transcends
the history of psychiatry: the history of medicine controls
itself, it is in command of its own destiny.
The myth of neutrality and objectivity has been trans-
ferred seamlessly from biomedicine to clinical psychiatry.
Again, to quote from one of the defenders of the biomedi-
cal model in psychiatry:
Whether the diagnosis is...mania, schizophrenia,
or obssesional neurosis...course or outcome is more
important than whether the individual is male or fe-
male, black or white, educated or ignorant, married or
divorced, well adjusted or not, religious or not, etc.25
Here diagnosis is seen as a neutral activity that
should not be affected by human diversity in any form:
ethnicity, sex, age, religion or social class. What is impor-
tant is the diseases, their treatment, course and out-
come, not the social characteristics of the patients. Nev-
ertheless, this conclusion is contradicted by data on the
hospitalization of patients in the United States according
to their ethnic group:
Blacks and Native Americans are considerably mo-
re likely than Whites to be hospitalized; Blacks are
more likely than Whites to be admitted as schizo-
phrenic and less likely to be diagnosed as having an
affective disorder; Asian American/Pacific Islanders
are less likely than Whites to be admitted, but remain
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for a lenghtier stay, at least in state and county men-
tal hospitals26.
The differences between Guze’s expectation and the
results of the study by Snowden and Cheung speak for
themselves. Where Guze perceives only the objectivity of
science, the facts suggest the partiality of its practitioner.
The differences in diagnosis, psychiatric hospitalization
and length of hospitalization according to ethnic group
reveal the fragility of the supposed neutrality of clinical
medicine, which is maintained by unreflexive practices
that render it impervious to social realities. It is hardly
surprising that cultural anthropologists have perceived
biomedicine as a peculiar cultural system whose ideologi-
cal nature is revealed, paradoxically, in its rejection of
ideology and its neutral self-representation in strictly sci-
entific and technical terms.
Amorality
A final characteristic of biomedicine that allows its
power to be obscured is a definition of knowledge that
places it outside the realm of morality. This attribute
clearly overlaps with the points mentioned above and
with others that can be discerned from a careful analysis
of biomedical discourse. The principle of amorality is
closely connected to the attempt to desocialize and uni-
versalize biomedicine and, likewise, to the attempt to
construct an aura of neutrality. In practice, however, this
principle shows some contradictions.
The American Psychiatric Association’s DSM-IIIR27,
the predecessor of the DSM-IV and DSM-IVTR to which
I have referred above, includes a scale for assessing the
intensity of psychosocial stress. In principle, this is not a
problem. However, if we study the scale closely we ob-
serve that it unambiguously states that »broke up with
boyfriend or girlfriend« has a stress value of 2, while
»marital separation« has an intensity of 3 and »divorce«
a value of 4. At no time does it explain why divorce is
worse than separation and for whom it is worse, because
the professional’s judgment clearly takes precedence
over the patient’s. Nevertheless, by an extraordinary
process of reification, the social fact is treated as an un-
deniably universal phenomenon and not as what it is: an
exclusively moral assessment.
Moral and ideological principles are also concealed in
the diagnostic principles of the DSM-IVTR. For example,
to diagnose an »antisocial personality disorder« three or
more of the following items are required: (1) »fails to con-
form to social norms with respect to lawful behavior...«,
(2) »deceitfulness, as indicated by repeated lying, use of
aliases...«, (3) »impulsivity or failure to plan ahead«, (4)
»irritability and aggressiveness«, (5) »reckless disregard
for safety of self or others«, (6) »consistent irresponsibil-
ity, as indicated by repeated failure to sustain consistent
work behaviour or honour financial obligations« and (7)
»lack of remorse«. The DSM-IIIR even used as a diagnos-
tic criterion »Has never sustained a totally monogamous
relationship for more than one year.« This is no longer
used as a criterion in DSM-IV, although it has not disap-
peared completely from the manual because it is used as
an example to explain the diagnostic criteria of this dis-
order. But let us take a closer look at possible combina-
tions of three criteria; for example, »failure to conform to
social norms with respect to lawful behaviors«, »deceit-
fulness, as indicated by repeated lying, use of aliases«,
and »lack of remorse«. Is this combination not applicable
to members of political opposition groups operating clan-
destinely in a dictatorial regime? Even the general diag-
nostic criteria introduced into DSM-IV and DSM-IV-TR
to prevent confusion between »personality traits« and
»personality disorders« – for example, »an enduring pat-
tern of inner experience and behavior that deviates mar-
kedly from the expectations of the individual’s culture«
or »the pattern is stable and of long duration« – are so
vague that they can easily be applied to any number of
individuals and behavior patterns. Therefore, it is hardly
surprising that studies of prison populations have re-
vealed percentages of antisocial personality disorder as
high as 80%. On the contrary, the surprising thing would
be to find lower percentages using these criteria. There is
obviously something wrong with this decontextualized
use of social and cultural variables. In fact, antisocial
personality disorder is a clear example of this obvious
contradiction between a biomedical ideal of amorality
and the impossibility in practice of adhering to this
model.
Conclusion
By denying the social and political dimension of ill-
ness, biomedicine (and biomedical psychiatry)28, 29 found
a solution to some of the conflicts which could have para-
lyzed its technical development. Biomedicine (and bio-
medical psychiatry) is not only a science; it is also a tech-
nique that requires a certain ability to respond quickly,
and problem-solving took precedence over reflection on
the power structures that constitute its corpus of knowl-
edge. In recent years, these structures have been re-
vealed by medical anthropology’s attempts to elucidate
concealed metaphors. This paper is part of the effort to
show that scientific objectivity is a cultural assumption,
and thereby to make the artifices of the invisible visible.
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BIOMEDICINSKA PSIHIJATRIJA I NJENE SKRIVENE METAFORE:
ANTROPOLO[KA PERSPEKTIVA
S A @ E T A K
Ideja da odnosi mo}i strukturiraju dru{tveni `ivot o~ita ve}ini antropologa. Zapadno medicinsko znanje ili biome-
dicina, a time i znanost sve su do nedavno bili izuzeti od antropolo{kog pove}ala u politi~kom smislu. Razumijevanje
biomedicine kao sustav znanja koji nije kopija ~injenica ve} njihova predod`ba dovelo je prekida tradicionalne odvo-
jenosti narodnog znanja i znanstvenih spoznaja u antropologiji, ~ime je bilo mogu}e uklju~iti biomedicinu u repertoar
etnografskih objekata. Osobitost biomedicine kao kulturnog sustava, gledano iz ove perspektive, le`i na paradoksu:
njezina smokarakterizacija kao skup neideolo{kih diskursa i praksi je predod`ba kojom skriva svoju ideolo{ku prirodu,
zasi}enu s mo}i. Kroz analizu DSM-IV-TR, ovaj ~lanak istra`uje neke od reprezentacijskih strategija kojima se to pri-
krivanje doga|a u biomedicinskoj psihijatriji: asocijalni i univerzalni karakter kategorija du{evnih bolesti; neutralnost
klini~ke prakse, te nemoralna priroda klini~kih kriterija i procjena. To su pritajene metafore u pravom smislu te rije~i,
jer ne samo da govore o ne~emu bez da to imenuju ve} oni tako|er pori~u svoje postojanje kao metafore.
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